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THE INSUFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY
OF KOSOVA AS ATTAINED THROUGH THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A CALL FOR STATEHOOD
ILIRIANA ISLAMI*
INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, a proliferation of nonstate actors has changed the
landscape of the international community. We are witnesses to the fact that
during the twentieth century, international law underwent what might be
described as a metamorphosis. 1 Essentially, international law evolved from
a system primarily concerned with the regulation of the behavior of states
to one in which the rights of individuals hold a central focus. 2 Thus, the
armor of absolute national sovereignty was pierced, and the relationship
between a state and its citizens became a matter of concern for the global
community. 3 Such an evolving consciousness resulted in a plethora of in-
ternational treaties concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;4 the International
* Iliriana Islami is an associate professor of law at the University of Pristina. Editor's note: After
the writing of this Essay and before the publication of this issue, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe issued a recommendation for the establishment of a human rights court for Kosovo.
Recommendation 1691 (2005), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Adopted-
Text/TA05/EREC1691 .htm.
1. See Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of
Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 269 (2001)-
2. Antonio Cassese, Individuals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 113,
113 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991). Cassese commented that:
It is well known that States and insurgents are "traditional" subjects of the international com-
munity, in the sense that they have been the dramatis personae on the international scene
from the beginning. Recently, especially after the Second World War, other poles of interest
and activity have gained international status: international organizations; "peoples" finding
themselves in certain conditions and being endowed with a representative structure (i.e. lib-
eration movements); and individuals. The emergence of these "new" subjects is a distinct fea-
ture of modem international law.
d
3. The key shift in focus came after World War II, when international law began to concentrate
on states' treatment of their own citizens; that is, international law began to focus on human rights, an
area that was previously thought to lie exclusively within the realm of internal, domestic law. Peter E.
Quint, International Human Rights: The Convergence of Comparative and International Law, 36 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 605, 605 (2001).
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. pt. 1, at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;5 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 6 the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention of
Human Rights" or "ECHR");7 the American Convention on Human
Rights; 8 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 9 The re-
sult, in Kosova at least, has been an attempt to define the polity in terms of
human rights. Thus, the mantra "Standards before Status," a policy under
which Kosova must achieve certain human rights standards (among other
standards) before the international community will even begin to discuss
final status. 10
The state, however, remains a critical component of international law
and international relations. 11 Because "certain substantive values in con-
temporary international law pose real challenges to the legitimacy of [sov-
ereign] statehood as a basis for international [social] order," 12 I begin with
a discussion of the challenges and new approaches to statehood. I then
discuss the problematic, but very real, immunity of the U.N. Mission in
Kosova ("UNMIK") and the Kosovo Force ("KFOR"). I argue that Kos-
ovars should have remedies available to them in the European Court of
Human Rights against these entities. Almost anyone has standing to sue in
the European Court of Human Rights, but only states signatory to the
European Convention of Human rights have obligations. Kosovo, not hav-
ing an international legal personality, cannot sign the Convention, and thus
one alleging abuse of rights in Kosovo has no remedy before the Court. I
argue that Kosovars should have remedies available to them in the Euro-
pean Court of Human rights. At the same time, I argue that defining Kos-
ova's polity in terms of human rights is akin to putting the cart before the
horse. Human rights "cannot form a meaningful basis for [a] social order"']
3
because the implementation of those rights relies on conceptually inde-
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [here-
inafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic Rights].
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention of Human Rights].
8. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
9. African [Banjul] Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58.
10. Standards for Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/PR/1078 (Dec. 10, 2003), at http://www-unmikonline.org/press/2003/pressr/pr1078.pdf.
11. Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 407-47 (1999).
12. Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 397 (1991).
13. Id. at 399.
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pendent and international political institutions. 14 Ultimately, I conclude
that, while Kosovars should be able to take full advantage of the European
Court of Human Rights, Kosovars also need to be able to obtain relief
against UNMIK, KFOR, and other entities in the national courts of an in-
dependent Kosova. In Kosova, human rights standards can best be exer-
cised through statehood itself.
1. CHALLENGES TO "SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD" UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Interpreting the tragic breakup of the former Yugoslavia posed a real
challenge for those who argued that sovereign statehood should no longer
serve as the basis of international law. 15 For the most part, new approaches
to statehood sought to redefine international law in the context of new
processes and recent developments, such as globalization 16 and human
rights. 17 In this respect, the quick imitation around the world of new trends
involving, among other things, food, architecture, life styles, and fashion
embodies our conception of "modernity."18 Likewise, political life has been
transformed qualitatively during the latter part of the twentieth century. As
Michael Donelan notes:
In the past, each country had separate fundamental problems; the present
problems face all men in all countries; they are common problems....
The problems and their solutions. .. are beyond the capacity of 150
separate sovereign states. The old political organisation of the world cor-
responds no longer to the technological abilities and appetites of modem
man and the consequent dangers. 19
Because modernity appears to be "inherently globalising,"20 the
Wesphalian model of international relations is seriously incomplete for the
future. As understood at Westphalia, the legal order is a system of contrac-
14. Id.
15. The tragic break up of Former Yugoslavia raised many questions, including whether the
demise of the nation-state would lead to international peace. It also raised the question of whether
development of human rights law is properly conceptualized as the "savior" of the individual from the
grips of the perceived tyrant, the sovereign state.
16. Globalization has been described by Twining as "those processes which tend to create and
consolidate a unified world economy, a single ecological system, and a complex network of communi-
cations that covers the whole globe, even if it does not penetrate to every part of it." William Twining,
Globalization and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications, 49 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 2 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 39/11, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
at 22, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986),
18. See MICHAEL COOK, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HUMAN RACE (2003).
19. Michael Donelan, A Community of Mankind, in THE COMMUNITY OF STATES 140, 142 (James
Mayall ed., 1982).
20. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 63 (1990).
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tual obligations among independent states. Now, this legal fiction is sup-
plemented by an as yet unarticulated new world order.21 This new approach
to political globalization is based on the observation that the national-
international boundary is evaporating, 22 a phenomena visible in the dis-
placement of national and regional economies by a global economy. 23 As
long as there is no compatibility between globalization and the concept of
sovereign statehood, the Westphalia model will remain a largely outdated
paradigm.
24
But it is not only reality that challenges the Westphalian preoccupa-
tion with states. Critics and international lawyers have worried about the
"persistent 6tatism of the international polity, and consequently of interna-
tional law."' 25 Two commonly formulated kinds of criticism of statehood
are moral criticism and sociological criticism. Moral critics argue that "the
very notion of sovereign statehood strengthens the national egoism that has
been responsible for so many cataclysms of the present century. '26 In terms
of human rights, moral critics claim that the self-interested behavior of
states should be replaced "with behavior that conforms to global concep-
tions of justice. '27 This rhetoric is often heard "in reference to achieving a
more equitable economic distribution among states." 28 Considering the
difficulty achieving an equitable distribution presents, it has been suggested
that general rules should be replaced with "flexible standards of reason-
ableness and international equity."'29
Sociological critics, on the other hand, stress the factual interdepend-
ence that has left "sovereignty" with a marginalized role.30 For instance,
the global capitalist system has reduced the influence national governments
possess over adjusting their national economies. Similarly, the insufficient
capacity of individual states to tackle the universal problems associated
21. Donelan, supra note 19, at 140, 142.
22. Philip Allott, The Emerging Universal Legal System, 3 INT'L L.F. 12, 14-15 (2001). There
exists a plethora of definitions of globalization, however, the common element to all such definitions is
the acknowledgement that "the national-international frontier is evaporating. Social reality is now
flooding in both directions across the frontier, including economic transactions and consciousness
transactions (religious, cultural, political). Internal social reality in most countries is now being substan-
tially determined by external social reality." Id.
23. Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights. Et Cetera,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1999).
24. Id. at 7.
25. Koskenniemi, supra note 12, at 401.
26. Id.; see also James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the
State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L_ 193 (1999).
27. Koskenniemi, supra note 12, at 401.
28. Id. at 401-02.
29. Id. at 402.
30. Id.
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with regulating transnational commercial business and the permanent
threats of international terrorism, drug trafficking, and the like further mar-
ginalizes the role of national governments. 3
1
Additionally, the protection of human rights is a powerful mainstream
force that can render statehood less important. For instance, the prohibition
of arbitrary deprivation of life is generally accepted as a normjus cogens.32
(Theoretically, state parties are bound pacta sunt servanda to fulfill the
obligations under human treaties through their introduction into the domes-
tic legal system.) 33 In this regard, forums such as the Organization for Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE"), the Council of Europe, and
the United Nations Human Rights Commission are developing and
strengthening mechanisms to curtail state power. Such developments may
even have supported claims regarding the customary character of certain
core restraints on the power of states. 34
A. The Role of Human Rights Adjudication in Eroding the Power of the
State
The adjudicatory processes involved in international human rights en-
forcement have also contributed to the erosion of state power. While often
overlooked, the phenomenon ofjudicial globalization, where the process of
judging, lawyering, and judicial outcomes themselves are affected by the
mounting influence of international bodies, has no doubt impacted state
31. Id.
32. DAVID RAIt, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 437 (2002); see also
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24(52), General Comment on Issues Relating to
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto,
or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, at
para. 10 (1994).
33. P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 55 (1992). The rule ofpacta sunt servanta exists under customary international law
and asserts that a state must perform its obligations under a treaty in good faith. "The rule has been the
cornerstone of international law from its earliest origins and it has acquired great importance for the
stability and development of international relations as instruments of peace and as a mechanism for
settlement of disputes." Id. This fundamental tenet also finds expression under conventional law, See,
for example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatics, May, 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 26,
which states that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith." The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Workers Delegate case de-
clared that a treaty engagement "is not a mere moral obligation," but constitutes a legally binding
obligation on the parties. Advisory Opinion No. 1, Was the Worker's Delegate for the Netherlands at
the Third Session of the International Labour Conference Nominated in Accordance with the Provisions
of Paragraph 3 of Article 389 of the Treaty of Versailles?, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 1, at 19 (July 31).
34. The prohibition of genocide falls under the broader heading of the prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of life. Rai6, supra note 32, at 437; see also THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).
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power. 35 Both legislatively, in the case of new laws establishing various
supreme courts around the world, and judicially, in decisions by judges that
are applied across a range of jurisdictions, the course of globalization has
offer[ed] fundamental challenges to contemporary legal theory. 36 Excessive
formalism and deference to the notion of parliamentary sovereignty has
given way to a more pragmatic and human rights-focused approach in the
judiciary of many states. This process has worked to infuse domestic legal
systems with the beneficial influence of international human rights law,
subject of course to human rights constraints. Through harmonization, in-
ternational human rights norms are beginning to be domesticated, and are
at long last "coming home" to what many believe is the most appropriate
forum in which to deal with such matters.
37
The "cross-fertilization of legal systems," whereby the borrowing of
interpretations leads to internationalization, has been described as "transju-
dicial communication. '38 Transjudicial communication can involve a legal
borrowing or a legal transplant into a domestic legal system; in either situa-
tion, legal unification and integration results. Transjudicial communication
is important because it erodes state power by creating symbiosis of interna-
tional law and municipal law. It goes in search of a middle ground and
finds that in reality many municipal judges in their interpretation already
use the complex interplay between international law and internal law. In
fact, if a state fails to act in a manner consistent with international law, the
state may still incur responsibility on the international plane; though, the
validity of the internal law remains unaffected. 39 Through this relationship,
checks and balances are created, which are needed to restrain the power of
a sovereign state.
B. The Formal Bureaucratic Rationale of the State
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that states have be-
come-or will ever become-irrelevant in the quest for human rights.
35. Claire L'Heureux-Dubd, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998). Judicial globalization is particularly evident in
the decisions of top-level appellate courts throughout the world. Id. at 16.
36. Twining, supra note 16.
37. Donald F. Woloshyn, To What Extent Can Canadian Courts be Expected to Enforce Interna-
tional Human Rights Law in Civil Litigation?, 50 SASK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985-86).
38. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transfudicial Communication, 29 UNIV. RICH. L. REV.
99,99(1994) (quoting MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 158 (1991) ("In Europe generally... and in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, national
law is increasingly caught up in a process of cross-fertilization among legal systems.")).
39. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSIDERED
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE RULE OF LAW 68, 79-80 (1957).
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States provide more robust bureaucratic mechanisms for protection of indi-
viduals than is ever likely to exist at the international level. State mecha-
nisms militate against the synchronizing effects of globalization. Even as
international society gains a share of competence over internal conduct, as
long as a state retains a measure of internal legitimacy vis-A-vis interna-
tional regimes, self-preservation occurs through the state's bureaucratic
policymaking organs. By increasing the discretionary authority it has over
actions, states can strengthen their own power over internal affairs in ac-
cordance with international law. Properly deployed, a state's formal bu-
reaucratic rationale provides a safeguard against totalitarianism and offers
security to its own citizens. Thus, statehood survives and should continue
to survive for the foreseeable future as long as it aims at a basic human
good. O'Connell proffers that "[t]he real point is that law, being a rule for
the solution of human conflicts, and deriving its distinguishing characteris-
tic from the sense of obligation which is the source of its cohesiveness,
should be harmonious and should not allow for contradictory rules of be-
haviour."40 Therefore the bureaucratic rationale of the state should continue
to survive for the foreseeable future until another more functional form will
be found.
I. INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF KOSOVA VIEWED THROUGH THE
LENS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Although human rights have developed to curtail state power, the
power of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") re-
mains unlimited, as it is not subject to judicial review. This is so despite the
fact that Resolution 1244,41 which authorized the creation of the Kosovo
Force ("KFOR") and UNMIK, implies an obligation, as a main responsibil-
ity of the international civil presence, to apply human rights. 42 The obliga-
tion to protect and promote human rights results as well from the U.N.
Charter, which aims to solve "international problems of an economic, so-
cial, cultural, or humanitarian character," and to promote and encourage
"respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all."'43 Resolu-
tion 1244 is itself based on this principle of the U.N. Charter, which, in and
40. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1970).
41. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 1th rntg., U.N. Doe. SJRES11244 (1999).
42. Id. 11(j). The KFOR and UNMIK are public organizations created for the purpose of secur-
ing and administering the territory on behalf of the international community. John Cerone, Minding the
Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 469, 471 (2001).
KFOR is the "international security presence," while UNMIK serves as the "international civil pres-
ence." Id.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 1 para. 3.
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of itself, imposes human rights protection obligations on the international
civil presence.
Moreover, UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, 44 as amended, provides that
"[ifn exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or
holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized
human rights standards and shall not discriminate against any persons on
any ground."'45 Such general provisions appear broad enough to also en-
compass the acts of international public administration officials. However,
although the commitment in Regulation 1999/1 has been designated "the
most important limitation for the exercise of international authority in Kos-
ovo," it has been argued that it has "not been matched by actually enforce-
able rights vis-6-vis UNMIK on behalf of the residents of Kosovo."
46
Generally, it has been argued that, through Regulation 2000/47,
47
UNMIK, in its legislative capacity, gave itself and its executive actions
immunity from judicial process [which] is in violation of international hu-
man rights standards and has rendered non-existent the right of Kosovars to
seek a remedy for violations of their fundamental rights.48 In particular,
"the courts in Kosovo are not authorized to declare UNMIK regulations
null and void and therefore inapplicable for non-conformity with the hu-
man rights instruments listed in Section 1.3 of Regulation [1999/24, as
amended.]" 49
44. On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doe. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 § 2 (July 25, 1999), amended by On the Law
Applicable in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIKIREG/1999/24 § 1.3 (Dec. 12, 1999).
45. Id.
46. Marcus G. Brand, Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of
UNMIK Legislation, 70 NORDIc J. INT'L L. 461, 472 (2001).
47. On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UTNMIK and Their Personnel in
Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Aug. 18,
2000).
48. Carsten Stahn, The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East Timor- A
First Analysis, in 5 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 105, 159-61 (Jochen A.
Frowein & Rudiger Wolfrun eds., 2001).
49. Id. at 157. Section 1.3 of UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 on the law applicable in Kosovo
(Dec. 12, 1999) as amended by UNMIK Regulation 2000/59 reads in pertinent part that "[i]n exercising
their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in Kosovo shall observe
internationally recognized human rights standards, as reflected, in particular" in: Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 4; European Convention of Human Rights, supra note 7; Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5; Covenant on Economic Rights, supra note 6; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/-cn/Treaties/Html/126.htm; and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 On the Law Appli-
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Additionally, the legislative system, as a process system created
through regulations established by UNMIK, is insufficient for many claims.
Because the effective remedies available to Kosovar citizens to seek satis-
faction of their rights are often very complicated or simply cannot be exe-
cuted against UNMIK, violations of the European Convention of Human
Rights may result.50
The UNMIK Regulation on Immunities and Privileges, No. 2000/47,
authorizes the establishment of ad hoc Commissions to preside over claims
for compensation of damage. 51 Under the provision, a third party can in-
voke the Regulation to claim compensation for property loss or damage,
personal injury, illness, or death arising from or directly attributed to
KFOR, UNMIK, or their personnel that do not arise from "operational
necessities" of KFOR or UNMIK.52 In its entirety, Regulation 2000/47
creates immunity from legal action for KFOR and UNMIK, including
against UNMIK's four "pillars" 53 led by the United Nations, the United
Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), the Organization
of Security and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE"), and the European Un-
ion. 54 Such immunity is problematic, as it runs counter to principles of
accountability for public servants and, although this immunity may be
waived, it is entirely dependent on the discretionary power of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General ("SRSG").
55
In practice the authority of UNMIK is unrestrained; the SRSG,
UNMIK's chief administrator, exercises unlimited legislative, executive,
and judicial authority.56 From a human rights perspective, there is no other
cable to Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/59
§ 1.3 (Oct. 27, 2000).
50. Section 1.3 of Regulation 1999/24, as amended, provides the human rights instruments to be
observed, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the European Convention on Human
Rights and its Protocols. See supra note 49 for a list of these instruments. Complicated administrative
procedures for the execution of the rights can be invoked based on Art. 5 and 6, together with Art. 13
(Right to Effective Remedy) of the ECHR. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, at
arts. 5, 6, 13.
51. Even in its use ofad hoc Commissions, UNMIK demonstrates its lack of respect for the rights
to a fair hearing under Article 6 of the ECHR. A Commission is established and operates on an ad hoc
basis. However, procedures provide only the right for damage compensation and do not provide a
remedy for citizens to realize a right or claim.
52. UNMIK/REG/2000/47 § 7.
53. Cerone, supra note 42, at 472.
54. UNMIK/REG/2000/47 § 1.
55. Id. § 6.1.
56. Section 1.1 of UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 on the Law Applicable in Kosovo, provided that
"[t]he law applicable in Kosovo shall be: (a) [t]he regulation promulgated by the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder; and (b) [tlhe law in force in
Kosovo on 22 March 1989." The Regulation further specifies that "[i]n case of a conflict, the regula-
tions and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder shall take precedence." UNMIK/REG/ 1999/24 § 1.1,
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higher forum that would review UNMIK's activities. 57 Without a clear
legal framework for the realization of rights and a mechanism for the re-
straint of excessive state power, the disproportionate authority concentrated
in the SRSG could go unchallenged and be applied unfairly. The obligation
to uphold internationally recognized human rights standards, including
antidiscrimination principles, could be rendered meaningless.
III. INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF KoSOVA VIEWED THROUGH THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
KFOR, in the course of its actions, has committed a number of viola-
tions of the human rights standards set forth in the ECHR.58 Most notably,
both UNMIK and KFOR have reportedly violated international human
rights principles by detaining individuals in contravention of judicial orders
of release and without providing mechanisms for detainees to challenge
their detention.59 Even though KFOR is a military organization and under a
separate chain of command as UNMIK,60 at the request of UNMIK offi-
cials, KFOR also performs civil tasks in Kosova.61
Because UNMIK is responsible for protecting and promoting human
rights, "KFOR's obligation to support UNMIK requires that it, at the very
least, refrain from undermining this objective [which]... can only be
achieved through compliance with international human rights standards [by
KFOR]." 62 Therefore, at a minimum, when KFOR undertook law enforce-
ment activities, it was required to uphold the same standards as bound the
U.N. civil administration. 63 Moreover, the Ombudsperson of Kosova, in
amended by Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, as Amended, on the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doe.
UNMIK/REG/2000/54 (Sept. 27, 2000).
57- Davide Marshall & Shelly Inglis, The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 102 (2003).
58. The ECHR is directly applicable in Kosovo according to UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 and the
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, U.N. Interim Administration in Kosovo,
U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 ch. 3 (May 15, 2001), available at
http://unmikonline.org/constframework.htm.
59. Carsten Stahn, International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins,
Developments and Challenges Ahead, 61 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 107, 152-53 (2001).
60. Under Security Council Resolution 1244, KFOR and UNMIK are to "coordinate closely" with
each other, though, separate entities are responsible for their establishment and they are placed under
distinct chains of command. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 41, J 6, 9(f).
61. The civil tasks are usually pcrformed by police forces and involve things such as arresting
suspects and protecting property. Michaella Salamun, Democratic Governance in International Territo-
rial Administration (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Graz).
62. Cerone, supra note 42, at 473-74.
63. Salamun, supra note 61.
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principle, is not authorized to receive complaints of abuses of individual
rights committed by KFOR.
64
A. Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights
It is scarcely possible to say that Kosovars have proper mechanisms to
protect their rights. Consider, in this regard, the decisions of the European
Commission of Human Rights concerning the immunity of the European
Space Agency ("ESA") from German jurisdiction, particularly Beer v.
Germany and Waite v. Germany.65 In these cases, the Commission found
that "the legal impediment to bringing litigation before the German Courts,
namely the immunity of the European Space Agency from German juris-
diction [was] only permissible under the Convention if there [was] an
equivalent legal protection. ' ' 66 The Commission considered whether Ger-
many's grant of immunity to the ESA was a violation of Article 6(1) of the
ECHR, and held that any limitation on the right of access to court had to be
grounded in "a legitimate aim [and have] a reasonable relationship of pro-
portionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
achieved." 67
This approach was then followed by the European Court of Human
Rights while giving particular weight to the question "whether the appli-
cants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effec-
tively their rights under the convention. '68 The decision of the European
Court of Human Rights was clear: where the Agency has immunity, the
citizen must be given either alternative equivalent protection or access to
the Court. Accordingly, the Court's decision confirms that because Kos-
ovar citizens do not have an alternative effective remedy to seek their
claim, Kosovar citizens should have access to the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. Because UNMIK is immune from suit in the courts of Kosova,
under the ESA decisions, UNMIK must be accountable, otherwise the
European Convention on Human Rights,69 and other mechanisms like In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the U.N. has
expressly made applicable to Kosova, are violated.
64. On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administra-
tion Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIKiREG/2000/38 § 3.4 (June 30, 2000).
65. See Stahn, supra note 59, at 147 (citing Beer v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, 30 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 261 (Feb. 18, 1999) (Court report); Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 261
(Feb. 18, 1999) (Court report)).
66. Id. at 147.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 147-48.
69. This is because there is no alternative form in which defendants may be made accountable.
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B. Kosovar Cases in the ECHR
In general, because there is no effective alternative remedy to protect
Kosovar rights, the option of bringing claims in the European Court of
Human Rights is the only dimension through which Kosova may acquire an
international personality. 70 Kosova's international personality would be
partially forged when the European Convention of Human Rights is applied
against KFOR. Even though Kosovar citizens likely have standing in the
Court, because Kosova cannot sign the European Convention on Human
Rights, no remedy is available to a Kosovar citizen that brings a claim in
the Court.
The first attempt to bring a claim by a Kosovar in the European Court
of Human Rights invoked Article 1 of the ECHR, the Right to Life, which
is a normjus cogens.7 1 This case is still pending; a decision on admissibil-
ity or inadmissibility has not yet been given, although one has been com-
municated to the respondent government of the relevant KFOR-
contributing country. 72 The application is based on the "effective power"
that K.FOR exercises in the territory of Kosova, and the "jurisdiction" that
member states of the Council of Europe can be said to exercise through
their KFOR troops, meaning that state agents of member states are obliged
to protect and respect human rights in the territory where they exercise
effective power. Council of Europe state members should be held liable
when their state agents, in this case KFOR troops, fail to execute "effective
power" to protect the human rights of citizens.
73
C. The Insufficiency of the International Personality of Kosova Through
the ECHR
Although the ability to obtain a remedy in the ECHR would be an im-
portant component of human rights protection in Kosova, that Court's ju-
risdiction alone would not be sufficient for the protection of human rights,
nor would the international personality of Kosova be complete through
70. In international law, "legal personality" refers to the capacity of a legal person to enjoy rights
and to be burdened with duties. Under the Westphalian system, only states have a legal personality in
international law.
71. Behrami v. France, App. No. 71412/01 (pending in the European Court of Human Rights),
decision communicated Sept. 16, 2003, as reported by European Court of Human Rights Information
Booklet No. 56. The case alleges negligence of Frcnch KFOR troops in the death of a child in the
explosion of a bomb in Kosovo.
72. Behrami v. France is based on an analogous application of the decision of the court in Loizi-
dou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513 (Dec. 18, 1996) (Court report).
73. Nuola Mole, Address as the Director of the Center on Advise on Individual Rights in Europe
(May 2000).
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access to the Court alone. The standards contained in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights are directly applicable in the territory of Kosova,
and yet the standards, and the Convention itself, cannot be invoked in their
full parameters, at least not to the full extent of truly protecting human
rights, because Kosovar citizens have no control over the legislative, ex-
ecutive, or judicial processes in Kosovo.
Without any meaningful participation in the government by Kosovar
citizens, and especially because those citizens have no remedy as against
UNMIK or KFOR in the national courts, human rights protection relies on
conceptually independent, political institutions to define those rights.
Therefore, human rights cannot form the meaningful basis for a social or-
der.74 If Kosovar citizens are to define our polity in terms of human rights,
we first need to know the number and content of such rights. But we cannot
ascertain our rights because rights are created through political processes,
over which we have no control and which are best exercised within a state
that is itself obligated under international law. Human rights, as social
norms, owe their existence and meaning to decision-making processes.
No form other than statehood can guarantee social order; even global-
ization, as noted by Henkin, does not herald the "withering away of the
state."' 75 The problem with defining the polity in terms of human rights is
exemplified in Kosova and the policy of "Standards before Status."
The executive, legislative, and judicial processes in Kosova are out of
Kosovar hands, but political processes create human rights. The bureau-
cratic rationale of statehood, because it is obligated under international law
to protect human rights, provides security to its citizens in that citizens
have a remedy in access to the national courts. When a citizen's right or
claim is not satisfied, there is a place for international law. International
law provides citizens of a national state with an effective remedy, under
certain conditions, to satisfy their claim. Through this process, international
law and national law work in harmony, providing checks and balances
instead of the superiority of any laws. Statehood for Kosova is necessary
before "standards" can be met; 76 it is through the checks and balances of a
system of international as well as national law that the rule of law in Kos-
ova can be improved. Currently, both components are missing in Kosova.
A system of international and national law is more sensical than the setting
74. Koskenniemi, supra note 12, at 399.
75. Henkin, supra note 23, at 7.
76. "Standards before Status" is the policy set up by UNMIK to postpone the final status for
Kosova. One of the standards is improving rule of law in Kosovo.
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of standards that have been characterized as difficult, if not impossible, for
any developing state to achieve.
CONCLUSION
Kosova shows that human rights alone cannot form a meaningful basis
for a social order, because without a state, the protection of human rights
relies on conceptually independent political institutions to define rights.
UNMIK exercises the legislative, executive, and judiciary systems through
the SRSG. The SRSG has unlimited power; UNMIK and KFOR have im-
munity and cannot be sued in the national courts of Kosova. Therefore, the
citizens of Kosova are deprived of access to the Court against either
UNMIK or KFOR. On the other hand, an "alternative equivalent remedy"
is not available to the citizens of Kosova. In this respect, Kosovar citizens,
as against KFOR, are applying directly to the European Court of Human
Rights. The availability of a remedy in the European Court would be the
humble beginnings of an "international personality" for Kosovo. This in-
ternational personality, however, is insufficient; only sovereign statehood
provides a complete basis for citizens to participate in a political process,
through which citizens can protect human rights and achieve the "stan-
dards" required for Kosova. Currently, Kosovar citizens are not in a posi-
tion to defend their human rights; therefore, statehood is necessary before
the international community's "standards" can be met.
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